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A Broken System:
Failures of the Religious Regulatory System in the
People’s Republic of China*
The system for regulating religion in the People’s Republic of
China (“PRC” or “China”) has faced increasing domestic and
international criticism in recent years. 1 However, there has been
little, if any, improvement in the regulation or protection of religious
freedoms in the PRC during the past decades. 2 This failure to act in
the face of increased criticism and international pressure has been
attributed to the continued policy of the Communist Party of China
(“CPC” or “Party”) to bring religious organizations under its
control. 3 This Comment will show that the current system of
religious regulation not only fails to promote internationally
recognized principles of religious freedom, but also is
counterproductive to CPC and PRC interests as it contributes to the

* An early draft of this Comment was partially adopted for publication in another work with
the help of additional authors. See Liu Peng, Brett G. Scharffs & Carl Hollan, Constitutional,
Legislative and Regulatory Change Regarding Religion in China, in LAW, RELIGION,
CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF RELIGION, EQUAL TREATMENT, AND THE LAW 247 (Cristiana
Cianitto, Cole Durham Jr., Sivio Ferrari & Donlu Thayer eds., 2013). Although both works
address the history and current issues of China’s policies toward religion, this Comment
provides an expanded treatment of those issues and China’s regulatory system. Further, this
Comment proposes an alternative solution to those offered in the other work, one based on
China’s regulatory system. References will be made throughout this Comment to those
sections that have been published in the other work.
1. The U.S. State Council has designated China as a “Country of Particular Concern”
since 1999 due to state-sanctioned religious persecution. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2011
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM - CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG
KONG,
AND
MACAU)
(2012),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/docid/502105ce50.html.
2. See generally Fuk-Tsang Ying, New Wine in Old Wineskins: An Appraisal of Religious
Legislation in China and the Regulations on Religious Affairs of 2005, 34 RELIGION, ST. &
SOC’Y 347 (2006).
3. See YOSHIKO ASHIWA & DAVID L. WANK, MAKING RELIGION, MAKING THE STATE:
THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN MODERN CHINA 9 (2009).
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growth of the illegal, underground, and consequently unregulated
practice of religion.
Part I of this Comment will outline the development of the
religious regulatory system in China since the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China. Part II will review the current system of
religious regulation. Part III will address CPC and PRC policies on
religious regulation and the interests and goals of the CPC and PRC.
Part IV will illustrate the failures of the current regulatory system and
policies in achieving the interests of the CPC and PRC through the
history of the Falun Gong in the PRC. Finally, a solution which
takes into account both CPC and PRC interests and international
standards of religious freedom protection will be proposed.
I. A PRIMER ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS POLICY IN THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Not unlike the histories of religion in other regions, the history
of religion in China is comprised of a patchwork of timelines of both
benevolence and sordid blunders. As in Europe, many of the
religious philosophies that have flourished in China are not native to
China. 4 However, to draw similar conclusions about Chinese
attitudes towards religion by comparing China with other regions
would be a mistake. Perhaps most influential in the development of
PRC and CPC policy has been the history of religion in China
during the 150-year period immediately preceding the ascension of
the Communist Party. During this time, organized religious societies
have been influential factors in civil wars, 5 rebellions, 6 corrupt

4. Of the current officially recognized religions in China (Daoism, Buddhism, Islam,
Catholicism [Quasi-Roman Catholic], and Christianity [Protestantism]), only Daoism is a
native Chinese religion (Confucianism is not recognized as a religion in China, though a
debate continues as to whether Confucianism is a religion or a philosophy).
5. See generally JONATHAN D. SPENCE, GOD’S CHINESE SON: THE TAIPING
HEAVENLY KINGDOM OF HONG XIUQUAN (1996) (describing the Taiping Rebellion, a civil
war lasting from 1845 to 1864 that claimed the lives of an estimated 20 million Chinese; the
movement was rooted in Christianity and its supporters promulgated their quasi-Christian
views in conquered territories).
6. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 189–93 (3d ed.
1990) (providing a brief overview of the Panthay Rebellion (1856–1873), when the Hui
Muslims of western China fought against the central government, and the Dungan Revolt
(1862–1877), another Muslim uprising in western China that threatened Chinese control); see
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principles, 7 the spread of foreign influence, 8 and the decline of
Chinese traditions and culture. 9 When these factors are combined
with Communist ideology on religion, there is little wonder that the
CPC’s initial policies were unfavorable and intolerant of organized
religious groups and, at times, even of unorganized religious
practice. During its sixty-year history, PRC and CPC policy has
vacillated between attempts to control religious organizations and
attempts to eradicate religion from the lives of Chinese citizens.
A. 1949–1966: Communism and Religion with Chinese
Characteristics
From the ashes of political upheaval, instability, foreign
domination, and civil war, the Chinese Communist Party and the
People’s Republic of China rose as Mao Zedong proclaimed that
China had “stood up.” 10 Despite initial promises that religious
freedom would be protected and that religious organization would
be left unfettered by the continuing Communist revolutionary
struggle, 11 Mao and the Communists immediately undertook to

also id. at 231–35 (describing the Boxer Rebellion (1898–1901), which was a Daoist/Qigong/Traditionalist uprising with strong religious themes, and showing how the combined
weakness of the central government and the strength of the Boxers eventually led to the
Emperor fleeing Beijing and foreign troops quelling the rebellion).
7. Id. at 414–15 (describing how Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist
government, altered traditional Confucian Principles to develop some of his ideologies).
8. See W. TRAVIS HANES III & FRANK SANELLO, THE OPIUM WARS: THE ADDICTION
OF ONE EMPIRE AND THE CORRUPTION OF ANOTHER 222 (2002). As Western nations
engaged in “gunboat diplomacy” and forced the Chinese to enter unequal treaties, the foreign
nations commonly required the Chinese government to allow Christian missionaries the
freedom to travel and proselyte within China.
9. Christian missionaries invited or required Chinese citizens to stop ancestor worship,
the worship of idols, polygamy, foot-binding, temple employment, and vegetarian vows. See
Eric Reindeers, Blessed are the Meat Eaters: Christian Antivegitarianism and the Missionary
Encounter with Chinese Buddhism, 12 POSITIONS 509, 525 (2004).
10. DAVID SCOTT, CHINA STANDS UP 1 (2007) (Immediately prior to the official
founding of the PRC, on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong declared to the Chinese people that
China had stood up and would never again be an insulted nation.).
11. See JOHN CRAIG WILLIAM KEATING, A PROTESTANT CHURCH IN COMMUNIST
CHINA: MOORE MEMORIAL CHURCH SHANGHAI, 1949–1989, at 79 (2012) (stating that
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reform every aspect of Chinese life, including religious organizations,
dogma, and adherents’ beliefs. 12 Moreover, early CPC leaders saw
organized religion as posing a direct threat to Communist ideals of
self-determinative Chinese sovereignty (or a Chinese rule absent
foreign intervention or control) and undivided loyalty to
Communism because of the close ties between religion and foreign
influence and because religious believers openly displayed loyalty to a
social organization other than the Communist Party.
In order to fight these threats of foreign influence and divided
loyalty, the Communist Party repurposed the United Front Work
Department (“UFWD”) in 1940. 13 The UFWD was first formed
when the Communists found themselves necessarily allied with the
Kuomingtang Nationalists to fight warlord generals following the fall
of the Qing Empire and later to fight the Japanese during World
War II. 14 The UFWD is a Party Department that falls within the
jurisdiction of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The
UFWD was originally created, as its name suggests, as a Party
structure that would be responsible for controlling contact with
extra-Party (Nationalist) leaders. The Department would ensure that
contact with these leaders would be uniform, or united, thereby
guaranteeing that struggles with these enemies via a “united front”
would result in Communist success. In 1940, the Department was
retooled to not only control contact with the Nationalists, but also
to control contact with the new Communist enemy; all extraCommunist political parties and groups; locally powerful cliques;
friendly armies; and political, economic, and social organizations and
figures (specifically including religions). 15
When the People’s Republic of China was officially established in
1949, the Communist Party formed the PRC government. The PRC
missionaries and parishioners were initially optimistic about relations with the PRC
government, hoping to maintain a “peaceful coexistence”).
12. Id. at 90; see also Beatrice K. F. Leung, China’s Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of
Managing Religious Activity, 184 CHINA Q. 894, 899 (2005) [hereinafter Leung, Managing
Religious Activity] (describing how regulations on time and location of religious observance
restricted the free exercise of Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, and Daoist adherents).
13. See LYMAN P. VAN SLYKE, ENEMIES AND FRIENDS: THE UNITED FRONT IN
CHINESE COMMUNIST HISTORY 268 (1967).
14. Id. at 1–2.
15. See id. at 268.
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government was created to rule as sovereign over China, though, in
reality, Communist Party leaders took up virtually all PRC
government posts and used the PRC government as a means to
actuate Party rule. With the creation of the PRC government came
the creation of the Religious Affairs Bureau (“RAB”), a government
agency which would oversee religious adherents and religious
organizations. The RAB was created in accordance with the PRC
constitutional requirements and fell within the jurisdiction of the
State Department. 16 Though falling within the jurisdiction of the
State Department, the RAB was primarily accountable to the
UFWD. 17 The RAB was responsible for implementing the policy the
UFWD created. Thus, religious organizations seeking legal entity
status would need to register through the RAB according to the
requirements the UFWD established.
Following their rise to power, one of the first acts of the CPC
and RAB was to expel all foreign missionaries from China. 18 By 1952
all foreign missionaries had left China. 19 After former missionaries
and Western religious society leaders returned home, the CPC
pressed for China to move past Christianity towards the Communist
ideal of scientific atheism. Chinese scholars sought to undermine
Chinese ties to Christianity by equating Christianity with foreign
imperialism, foreign domination, the unequal treaties of the
nineteenth century, the defeated Nationalist government, and
“cultural imperialism.” 20
The expulsion of foreign missionaries from China had limited
effect in fulfilling CPC interests. The concern of divided loyalties, as
well as concerns about the inability of the CPC to control religious
groups’ loyalties, led to another, far more sweeping, change in CPC
policy toward religion in China. A well-intentioned, though perhaps

16. See PHILIP L. WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND: PROTESTANT
CHRISTIANITY, THE THREE-SELF MOVEMENT, AND CHINA’S UNITED FRONT 70–71 (2011)
[hereinafter WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND].
17. Id.
18. See WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 60.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 62.
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mal-aligned, Christian Socialist with close ties to the Communist
Party provided the ultimate solution that would allow the
Communists to eliminate foreign influence over religious believers
and ensure that religious believers’ primary loyalties lie with the
Party. Reviving an old exit strategy drafted by several Western
missionaries in 1892 21 because many Christian churches were facing
certain dissolution due to the block of foreign financial assets sent to
China, 22 Wu Yaozong (commonly referred to by his “Western” name
of Y.T. Wu) began advocating a strategy to ensure the survival of
Christianity in Communist China in 1948. 23 In May 1950, Wu and
several other Christian leaders met three separate times with the
premier of the newly-formed People’s Republic of China, Zhou
Enlai, and discussed plans to organize what has come to be known as
the “Three-Self Patriotic Movement” (the “TSPM”). 24 In July 1950,
Wu and other Christians published “The Christian Manifesto,” a
political treatise with the principle theme of anti-imperialism. 25 The
Manifesto “stressed the fact that in the past imperialism has made use
of Christianity, and the necessity to purge imperialistic influences
from within Christianity itself.” 26 To accomplish this purge of
imperialistic influences, the movement embraced three basic
principles:
“self-governance,”
“self-support,”
and
“selfpromulgation.” 27 This total severance of foreign ties would mean
that Chinese Christians could only look to Chinese nationals for
ultimate terrestrial religious authority; they would reject any support
or financial aid from foreign sources; and Chinese Christianity would
promulgate itself without the input or aid of foreign missionaries. 28

21. See Paul Grant, The Three Self Patriotic Movement in China, THE NETWORK FOR
STRATEGIC
MISSIONS
(Jan.
1,
2007),
http://www.strategicnetwork.org/index.php?loc=kb&view=v&i
d=8345&printerfriendly=Y&lang=.
22. See KEATING, supra note 11, at 89.
23. See GAO WANGZHI, CHRISTIANITY IN CHINA: FROM THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
TO THE PRESENT 344 (1999).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 343–44.
26. Id. at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. See id.
28. Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 250.
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While Wu and his “Christian Manifesto” faced sharp criticism
from Chinese Christians for being “too radical,” 29 half of the
Chinese Christian population (about 400,000 of the 700,000 total
Christian believers) accepted the manifesto and the underlying
principles of self-sufficiency by 1952. 30 Wu’s resulting popularity and
clout with CPC officials led to the emergence of the TSPM as the
premier Christian ecclesiastical authority in China. 31 The number of
Christians who would not align with the Party-sponsored TSPM
dwindled as anti-American movements, motivated by American
involvement in the Korean War, the Three-Anti’s Movement, and
the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries resulted in
public accusation sessions, labor reform sentences, or the execution
of anyone accused of espousing non-Communist ideologies. 32 The
TSPM’s role in the Chinese religious regulation model was solidified
in 1958 when the CPC officially dissolved all Protestant sects and
unified all Protestant churches as a single faith in an attempt to
collectivize religious organizations in the same way all other aspects
of Chinese life would be collectivized. 33
The changes in the Chinese Protestant Church would soon
spread to other religious organizations. Not long after the release of
the TSPM’s “Christian Manifesto,” the Party sought out and tried to
mobilize Catholic leaders to endorse the same “three-self” principles
Wu and the Protestants had embraced. 34 Land Reform Campaigns

29. GAO, supra note 23, at 344.
30. See id.
31. Id. Wu has been strongly criticized by his contemporaries and modern day historians
alike for his role in the creation of a Communist-controlled Christian church. In the words of
his contemporary: “Wu has been branded by some a heretic or an anti-Christ, while others
would question his intentions and integrity as a Christian and wonder if he has not betrayed his
faith through the close alliance with the Communist government.” Id. at 338. His high
position in the Communist-TSPM hierarchy serves as confirmation for some that his motives in
leading the Chinese Christian revolution were less than pure.
32. See SEBASTIAN HEILMANN & ELIZABETH J. PERRY, MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND: THE
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 145 (2011).
33. See GAO, supra note 23, at 347; see also Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at
250–51.
34. See BEATRICE K. F. LEUNG & WILLIAM T. LIU, CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN
CONFLICT:1949–2001 84, 86–87 (2004).
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reallocated much of the property held by the Catholic Church into
PRC and Party control. 35 The Anti-Rightist movements of the 1950s
and the anti-foreigner sentiment were used to further discredit the
Catholic clergy and purge the Chinese Catholic Church of leaders
who would not conform to PRC and Party policy. 36
In 1956, the only four Chinese Catholic bishops who were not
then in prison went to Beijing and met with PRC Premier Zhou
Enlai. Zhou promised that if the Chinese Catholic Church severed
ties with the Vatican, Chinese Catholics would be free to practice
their religion in peace. 37 These four bishops organized a nationwide
meeting on July 15, 1957, and declared the formation of the
Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (“CCPA”). 38 These bishops
took upon themselves the leadership positions in the CCPA and
released a statement severing any relationship between the CCPA
and the Vatican and any loyalty of the Chinese Catholic Church to
the Holy See. The following year, the Party’s UFWD and the PRC’s
RAB authorized the CCPA to ordain two bishops and eleven priests
without the Vatican’s approval. Pope Pius XII responded in June
1958 by condemning the CCPA and the Chinese Catholic Church, 39
establishing a strained relationship between the Chinese Catholic
Church and the Vatican that has continued for the past fifty-six
years.
Buddhism and Daoism lacked the strong hierarchical structures
of the Catholic and other Christian faiths; thus, the Party and the
PRC had little trouble in establishing an oversight organization to
control religious believers. 40 The Party could not rely on foreign ties
in their attacks of Buddhism and Daoism, so they instead attacked
the two belief systems as being vestiges of the feudal society China
sought to leave behind, as shelters for the Kuomingtang rebels, and
as remnants of the capitalist class system. 41 It was fairly simple for the
Party to establish both the China Taoist Association and Buddhist
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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Association of China as oversight bodies to regulate the religious
practice of their believers. These associations were organized in 1953
and subscribed to the same “three-self” principles as the TSPM
Protestant Church. 42
The organization of the Chinese Muslims in western China was
accomplished through a slightly different methodology. UFWD and
PRC leaders established the Islamic Association of China (“IAC”) in
1953. 43 State and Party favoritism gave the IAC the advantage as
they gradually grew and absorbed existing Muslim associations,
Muslim (shariah) courts, and Muslim schools. Similar to the
regulations limiting other faiths, “[t]he state . . . [began] to play a
significant role in shaping what elements of Islam were to be
considered legal, legitimate, and ‘real’ and what practices were illegal
and subversive acts of superstition, and outside the narrowed scope
of ‘true’ Islam.” 44
With these Patriotic Religious Associations established, the
Communist Party had created the framework for the control of
religious observance in the People’s Republic of China. The UFWD
and RAB worked within this framework to attempt to build a system
by which they could control all religious activity in China. 45 Aside
from a four year span from 1958 to 1962 when the Islamic
Association of China was dissolved, 46 the UFWD and RAB sought to
control religious believers through control of the Patriotic Religious
Associations. Control was established by encouraging turmoil within
these associations, by selecting and promoting leadership that was
loyal to the Communist cause, and through political
indoctrination. 47 Moreover, Chinese citizens understood that
42. See André Laliberté, The Political Consequences of Religious Revival in the People’s
Republic of China, ST. ANTONY’S INT’L REV., Jan. 2004, at 31.
43. Stephen E. Hess, Islam, Local Elites, and China’s Missteps in Integrating the Uyghur
Nation, USAK Y.B. INT’L POL. & L. 407, 412 (2010).
44. Id.
45. See Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 899–900.
46. See Hess, supra note 43.
47. See Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 900 (leadership
selection); GEORGE N. PATTERSON, CHRISTIANITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA 87 (1969)
(political indoctrination).
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religious believers would always be second-class citizens. “To the
question, ‘Can a Christian believe in the New Democracy?’ [Chinese
Communist movement] the answer was yes: ‘Yes . . . but he cannot
be an official worker in the party or the government.’” 48

Figure 1: The framework of control over religious believers. The proper titles of certain
divisions may vary by locations (e.g., the Shanghai City government operates at the level of
other provinces, and intra-city divisions exist down to the neighborhood/street level). While
never fully realized in all provinces, this framework shows the relationships of control that were
established to regulate religious freedom.

B. 1966–1979: The Dissolution of the Regulatory System
Beginning as early as 1963, leftist extremists began to persecute
religious adherents for their disloyalty towards Communist ideals. 49
Following a formal notice released by the highest Party body
denouncing certain anti-Maoists, the extreme left-wing movement
exploded across China. 50 This “Great Proletariat Cultural
Revolution” 51 thrust China into a state of anarchy as groups of
48.
49.
50.
51.
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student-aged “Red Guards” roamed the country seeking to destroy
the “four olds”: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas.
“Religion was one of the early targets of the ‘Red Guards,’ because it
typified the problem of the ‘four olds.’” 52 Unlike previous antirightist campaigns, the Red Guards attacked both official and
unofficial religious organizations. In August 1966, the Red Guards
shut down all religious centers throughout the country, regardless of
their standing with the Communist Party. The Red Guards “stormed
the headquarters of the [Protestant] TSPM . . . with axes and
herd[ed] the entire staff together to confess their ‘crimes.’” 53 The
UWFD, RAB, and all Patriotic Religious Associations were dissolved
and all religious practices were driven underground. 54
Any citizen found to be or accused of being a religious believer
was in danger of persecution by the Red Guard. Scriptures were
burned, relics were destroyed, and believers were forced to endure
public accusation sessions and torture. The Red Guard also forced
celibate leaders to marry, Muslims to eat pork or raise pigs, and
Christians to deny their faith. 55 Many religious leaders and religious
believers were imprisoned, tortured, or executed. 56 Official records
from this time are sparse on information; 57 however, personal
histories indicate that most religious believers in China were
significantly affected by the Cultural Revolution. Religious leaders
who avoided more significant persecution did so by proving
connections with the Communist Party. 58 Ironically, many who
survived the Cultural Revolution have said that the persecution only
served to strengthen their religious resolve. 59
52. PHILIP L. WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING CHRISTIANITY IN CHINA: K.H. TING AND
CHINESE CHURCH 171 (2007) [hereinafter WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING
CHRISTIANITY].
53. KEATING, supra note 11, at 142.
54. See JAMES MILLER, CHINESE RELIGIONS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES 182
(2006); WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 69–70.
55. See WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING CHRISTIANITY, supra note 52, at 171.
56. Id.
57. See KEATING, supra note 11, at 145.
58. See id. at 142–43.
59. See WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 185.
THE
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C. 1979–2004: Reconstruction of the Religious Regulatory Structure
Following the death of Mao in 1976, the new CPC and PRC
leader, Deng Xiaoping, set about to rebuild China. During the Third
Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, Deng began
to re-establish the framework for religious control that had been
dissolved during the Cultural Revolution. During this session, the
CPC officially re-created the UFWD and RAB. 60 In 1980 the
Patriotic Religious Associations were re-established, “in line with the
resumption of the state’s policy of co-opting religion into patriotic,
state-controlled religious orders.” 61 Religious adherents set about
rebuilding their religious institutions while the CPC sought an
answer for dealing with “the religious question” in China. 62 In
answer to the “religious question,” the Central Committee of the
CPC released “Document No. 19” in 1982. 63 This document
acknowledged that “the long-term influence of religion among a
part of the people in a Socialist society cannot be avoided,” but also
continued to assert that “[r]eligion will eventually disappear from
human history.” 64
The Central Committee explained that they had “restored the
activities of the patriotic religious associations” and that
the Party’s and government’s basic task in its religious work will be
to firmly implement and carry out its policy of freedom of religious
belief; to consolidate and expand the patriotic political alliance in
each ethnic religious group; to strengthen education in patriotism
and Socialism among them, and to bring into play positive
elements among them in order to build a modern and powerful
Socialist state. 65

60. See id. at 68–71.
61. Hess, supra note 43, at 414; see also WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND,
supra note 16, at 188–89.
62. Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China, Document 19, the Basic Viewpoint
on the Religious Question During Our Country’s Socialist Period, translated in DONALD
MACINNIS, RELIGION IN CHINA TODAY: POLICY AND PRACTICE 8–26 (1989), available at
http://www.purdue.edu/crcs/itemResources/PRCDoc/pdf/Document_no._19_1982.pdf.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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In short, the Communist Party sought to rebuild the framework
of control that had existed during the 1950s, encourage religious
adherents to submit to the authority of the patriotic religious
associations, and to use the influence of the CPC over these religious
associations to further Communist ideologies and principles.
However, the Party maintained that “[t]he basic policy the Party has
adopted toward the religious question is that of respect for and
protection of the freedom of religious belief.” 66
It was also in 1982 that the PRC adopted a new constitution. 67
Included in the new constitution was Article 36, which purports to
guarantee religious freedoms for citizens of the PRC. 68 This
provision states that citizens enjoy the freedom to either believe in or
not believe in religion; however, the practice of religion is limited to
the practice of “normal religious activities.” 69 “Normal religious
activities” are not defined in the constitution; therefore, the
normalcy of religious activity has been defined by UFWD policy and
RAB administration. 70 Moreover, the constitution reaffirms the
ideals of the three-self movement for religious organizations. 71
This regulatory framework ultimately led to the development of
China’s current unique religious market. Yang Fenggang’s influential
essay on the red, black, and gray markets of religion in China offers
an excellent model for understanding the religious market in

66. Id.; Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 252–53.
67. See WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING CHRISTIANITY, supra note 52, at 212.
68. XIANFA
art.
36
(1982)
(China),
available
at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.
Article 36. Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious
belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to
believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against
citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal
religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that
disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational
system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any
foreign domination.
69. Id.
70. See Fenggang Yang, The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China, 47
SOC. Q. 93, 101 (2006).
71. See XIANFA (1982) (China).
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China. 72 Yang describes religious organizations as belonging to one
of three separate markets: the red market, which consists of religious
organizations aligned with the CPC-sponsored patriotic religious
associations; the black market, which consists of religious
organizations that the PRC government has officially banned; and
the gray market, which consists of religious organizations that are
not aligned with the patriotic religious associations, but not officially
banned, or religious organizations aligned with patriotic religious
associations acting outside legal boundaries. 73 This model for
understanding religious regulation and practice is helpful for those
who are not familiar with the complexities of Chinese law that is
often applied unequally according to unspoken, unpublished
principles outsiders may not know.
While the structure of the religious regulatory system in China
has seen little change since the early 1980s, the policies surrounding
religion have changed dramatically. In the 1980s, following the
beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union in eastern Europe,
CPC leaders became increasingly worried about “antirevolutionary
activities that are undertaken under the cloak of religion,” and
foreigners and destabilizing groups “us[ing] religion to turn [their]
young people against [them].” 74 Unfortunately for the CPC leaders
who sought to tighten the controls of the UFWD and the State
Administration for Religious Affairs (“SARA”) over these potentially
subversive organizations, one of the major effects of the Cultural
Revolution was that religious organizations were driven
underground. 75 In response, CPC officials vacillated between liberal
allowances of religious freedom and tightened policies to gain the
loyalty of underground religious groups, to appease Western
demands, and to ensure control over religious groups. 76 The UFWD
and RAB also approved the creation of several new Official Religious

72. See generally Yang, supra note 70, at 101.
73. See generally id.
74. Beatrice K. F. Leung, Catholic Bridging Efforts with China, 28 RELIGION, ST. &
SOC’Y 185, 186 (2010) [hereinafter Leung, Catholic Bridging Efforts].
75. Id. at 187.
76. See KEATING, supra note 11, at 182–83; WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING
CHRISTIANITY, supra note 52, at 220.
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Associations, raising the total number of Party-approved religious
associations to eight. 77
Along with the policy reforms of the 1980s came an explosion in
religious membership, particularly in Catholic and Protestant
membership. The PRC estimated that there were approximately
three million Catholics and three million Protestants in China in
1982. 78 By 1994, the number of Catholics in China had increased to
over twelve million, with membership split between the official
Patriotic Religious Association and underground Catholic
churches. 79 Protestant church membership saw a later but steady rise
in membership, increasing to six million in 1993, to ten million in
1997, and to over fourteen million in 2004. 80 Much to the
disappointment of UFWD and RAB officials, a large percentage of
these new religious members joined churches led by religious clergy
who had been imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution, who were
released during the era of reform, and who ignored CPC directives
and chose to operate within the ‘gray market.’ 81
In response to increased worries by CPC leadership about the
growth of religious groups and their potential to harbor subversive
elements that might undermine CPC control, restrictions on
religious freedom saw a general increase throughout the early
1990s. 82 The main thrust of these regulations was to crack down on
unofficial religious organizations and to encourage the patriotic
religious associations to further “adapt to the socialist regime.” 83
Official clergymen were targeted by the Party and State and were
sent to RAB conferences for indoctrination seminars, while unofficial

77. WICKERI, RECONSTRUCTING CHRISTIANITY, supra note 52, at 221–22; see also
Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 900.
78. Yang, supra note 70, at 103.
79. Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 905.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 902; see also Hongyi Harry Lai, The Religious Revival in China, 18
COPENHAGEN J. OF ASIAN STUD. 40, 48 (2003) (stating that in the early 1990s it was
estimated that less than one-fifth of Catholics in China attended the officially recognized
Patriotic Church).
82. Leung, Catholic Bridging Efforts, supra note 74, at 187.
83. Id.
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clergy were arrested. 84 Jiang Zemin, then the CPC and PRC leader,
explained to the UFWD what this adaptation to the socialist regime
would entail: “This type of adaptation does not require religious
adherents to abandon theism and religious beliefs. . . . [Rather,]
[t]hey should alter those religious systems and doctrines which do
not go along with socialism . . . .” 85 During this same period there
were periodic crackdowns against Buddhists in Tibet and Muslims in
Xinjiang, which the PRC government said were instigated by
“religious activities [that] threatened national security.” 86
A similar nationwide regulatory tightening on unofficial religious
organizations occurred just a few years later after the explosion of the
Falun Gong movement and the subsequent crackdown by CPC and
by PRC authorities to suppress the movement. 87 Fenggang Yang
asserts that the increased regulation of religious practice during this
period has directly led to the burgeoning of the “gray” and “black”
religious organizations during this same time. 88 Whether or not CPC
leaders saw this same correlation, in December 2001 Jiang Zemin
spoke to a group of CPC and PRC officials and dramatically changed
CPC religious policy. In his speech, Jiang spoke of religion as a
phenomenon that will survive for a long time and recognized that
religion may have a significant social stabilizing effect. 89 This change
in religious policy would lead to a new era of religious regulation.
D. Recent Developments in Religious Regulation
After Jiang Zemin stepped down from power, Hu Jintao
assumed the top position in both the Communist Party and PRC
government. Hu’s tenure was defined by some as “responsive
authoritarianism”: a more populist, accountable, and law-based
system of governance that sought to maintain the status quo where
possible, but reacted authoritatively in response to social problems. 90
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 906.
87. Yang, supra note 70, at 113.
88. Id. at 99.
89. Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 910.
90. THOMAS LUM & HANNAH FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CHINA: TRENDS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1 (2009).
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During Hu’s tenure, religious activity in both registered and
unregistered religious organizations increased. 91 Hu advocated for all
Chinese citizens, including religious citizens, to promote the
development of a “harmonious society” in an attempt to increase the
social stability of China and the legitimacy of the Communist
Party. 92 Communist leaders also began “to acknowledge the positive
role that Christianity can play in promoting social development, yet
remain[ed] deeply suspicious and fearful of its potential power as a
source of autonomous organization.” 93 As Hu prepared to step
down and appoint a new generation of leaders in 2012, many
scholars in China were optimistic that Xi Jinping, the front-runner
for assuming Hu’s position, would implement religious reforms that
would lead to greater religious freedom in China. However,
following Xi Jinping’s appointment to power, China has increased,
not decreased, the restriction of religious practice in China.
During 2014 in particular, it seems that an unpublished policy
change originating in the highest echelons of Communist leadership
has resulted in a renewed crackdown on religious organizations.
More troubling, however, is that these recent waves of crackdowns
have resulted in the suppression of black-market religious
organizations, gray-market religious organizations, and even the
officially and legally recognized red-market religious organizations.
One black-market religious group that was specifically targeted in
2014 is the Eastern Lightning Church, or the Church of Almighty
God. Although the church was defined as a “heretical cult” during
the mid-1990s, suppression of the group was renewed after May 28,
2014. On that day, six members of the Eastern Lightning Church
approached a woman in a McDonald’s restaurant in Shandong
Province and asked for her phone number. When the woman
refused, the believers beat the woman to death in the restaurant. 94

91. Id. at 4.
92. Holbig, Heike, Remaking the CCP’s Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits
under Hu Jintao, 38 J. OF CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 35, 50–51.
93. See LUM & FISCHER, supra note 90, at 13.
94. 1,500 Cult Members Arrested in Past Two Years, China Says After McDonald’s
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(June
11,
2014),
Killing,
SOUTH
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However, much more troubling have been the recent
crackdowns against formally recognized or formerly formally
recognized religious organizations during 2014. The first significant
suppression began in late 2013, when a pastor in Henan Province
was told by local authorities that officials intended to repossess the
property where his church stood. 95 When the pastor, Zhang Shaojie,
refused to comply with government orders, he was arrested. 96
Although Zhang was a pastor for a TPSM church and had operated
within the law, officials designated the church as a “heretical cult,”
disbanded the organization, and charged Zhang and several
followers with crimes under Article 300 for participating in an illegal
cult. 97
The suppression of Christian organizations, even legally
recognized organizations, also took place on a greater scale in
Zhejiang Province during 2014. The first major incident took place
in April, when the government demolished a $4.7 million chapel
that was recently built by a legally recognized TPSM church. 98
Although the government had previously approved of the
construction of the church building, government officials
inexplicably declared the building illegal and ordered its
demolition. 99 The demolition of Christian structures has continued
since June 2014, when local officials began destroying crosses on
Christian churches and detaining any religious believers who defy the
removal orders. 100 Chinese officials claim that these crosses were
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1529931/1500-cult-members-arrested-chinasays-after-woman-beaten-death-mcdonalds.
95. Tom Philips, Christian Leader Jailed for 12 Years amid Chinese Church Crackdown,
TELEGRAPH
(July
4,
2014),
THE
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10945422/Christian-leaderjailed-for-12-years-amid-Chinese-church-crackdown.html.
96. Id.
97. Id. See infra note 169 and accompanying text describing the enactment of Article
300.
98. Zoe Li, China Denies Church Demolition Is Persecution of Christians, CNN WORLD
(May
2,
2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/01/world/asia/china-churchdemolished/index.html?hpt=hp_t2.
99. Id.
100. Andrew Jacobs, China Removes Crosses from Two More Churches in Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES (July 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/asia/china-movesagainst-2-churches-in-campaign-against-christianity.html?_r=0.
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removed and buildings destroyed as a response to violations of
zoning ordinances. 101 Some sources state that these crackdowns are
part of a recently issued but unpublished directive to “eradicate”
unregistered gray market religious organizations within the next ten
years. 102 A recently released statement by Wang Zuoan, the Director
of SARA, where Wang states that China will soon redefine Chinese
Christian theology to be more compatible with socialism 103 confirms
that there has been a recent shift in policy, although the exact
purpose or effect of this change may not be understood for years.
The renewed repression of religious beliefs is not limited to
repression of Christian religious organizations. China also received
substantial criticism when officials in the Muslim-majority Xinjiang
Province forbade school children and government employees from
fasting during Ramadan, the Muslim holy month. 104 According to
some sources, those who refused to comply with the ban from
fasting were force fed by government officials. 105 These restrictions
contributed to a significant increase in violence and unrest in the
region that led to the deaths of hundreds of Muslims and resulted in
further restrictions, such as bans against beards and religious clothing
on public buses. 106

101. Ian Johnson, Church-State Clash in China Coalesces Around a Toppled Spire, N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/world/asia/church-stateclash-in-china-coalesces-around-a-toppled-spire.html.
102. Katrina Lantos Swett & M. Zuhdi Jasser, Commentary: China’s Grim Religious
POST
(July
29,
2014),
Freedom
Problem,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/commentary-chinas-grim-religiousfreedom-problem/2014/07/29/bf5133e0-1756-11e4-88f7-96ed767bb747_story.html.
103. China
Plans
Establishment
of
Christian
Theology,
CHINA
DAILY,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-08/07/content_18262927.htm (last updated
Aug. 7, 2014).
104. Ishaan Tharoor, China’s War on Ramadan Sees Muslim Students Forced to Break
POST
(July
11,
2014),
Fast,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/11/chinas-war-onramadan-sees-muslim-students-forced-to-break-fast/.
105. Kabita Maharana, Ramadan 2014: China Force Feeds Muslim Students to Break Fast
During Holy Month, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 12, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ramadan2014-china-force-feeds-muslim-students-break-fast-during-holy-month-1456367.
106. China: 96 Killed Last Week in Xinjiang, USA TODAY (Aug. 2, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/08/02/china-96-killed-last-week-in-
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II. THE CURRENT RELIGIOUS REGULATORY SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Structurally, there has been little change from the regulatory
structure re-established in the early 1980s. The national-level
Religious Affairs Bureau has since been renamed the State
Administration for Religious Affairs (“SARA”), though the name
remains unchanged at other administrative levels. 107 Religious
associations seeking legal entity status are subject to the jurisdiction
of several executive agencies, generally including both SARA or the
appropriate RAB and the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which administers
the affairs of social organizations. 108 Additionally, all religious
organizations that are not affiliated with a Patriotic Religious
Association (and some that are) receive some oversight from the
Ministry of Public Security, which is the public police administration
in China. 109 This is because religious organizations that are not
recognized as sub-entities to a patriotic religious association do not
have any legal entity status within China. 110 The Ministry of Public
Security exercises some jurisdictional oversight over these
organizations as “illegal groups.” Finally, the PRC State Department
has created the Institute of World Religions (“IWR”) as a
department within the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(“CASS”). The IWR is a state-sponsored think-tank that produces
scholarship and research on religion policies and practices. 111 This

xinjiang/13532061/; Chinese City Bans Islamic Beards, Headwear, and Clothing on Buses,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
6,
2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/06/chinese-city-bans-islamic-beards-head
wear-and-clothing-on-buses.
107. See CHRISTOPHER MARSH, RELIGION AND THE STATE IN RUSSIA AND CHINA:
SUPPRESSION, SURVIVAL, AND REVIVAL 211 (2011).
108. See KIM-KWONG CHAN & ERIC R. CARLSON, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN CHINA:
POLICY, ADMINISTRATION, AND REGULATION 10–11 (2005).
109. Id. For an in-depth analysis of the current Chinese religious regulatory structure,
see id.
110. While it is not expressly forbidden for a religious organization to be granted legal
entity status in the PRC without aligning with a Patriotic Religious Association, there are no
such groups who have been granted legal entity status.
111. VINCENT GOOSSAERT & DAVID A. PALMER, THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION IN
MODERN CHINA 321 (2011).
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section will provide a more in-depth view of the current religious
regulatory system in China. 112
A. The Communist Party of China and Religious Regulation
As discussed in the previous sections, the CPC is the ruling
political party in China. Currently the Party structure responsible for
monitoring and regulating religion in China is the United Front
Work Department. Within the UFWD, the Second Department of
the UFWD specifically oversees Religious and Minority Affairs in the
PRC.
The UFWD is a department that operates under the direct
supervision of the CPC’s Central Committee, 113 which oversees the
national structure of the CPC. 114 Within the Second Department
there are three major divisions: one managing religion, one
managing minority affairs, and the third is a “personnel office.” 115
Within the religious division there are several offices that specialize in
managing the religious affairs of different religions. Each office has
between four and eight cadres. This division, and each respective
office, has the responsibility of creating religious policy based on the
directives of Party leaders in the Central Committee or higher
bodies. 116
While the control the CPC has over religious affairs is more
appropriately explored in the following sections that deal with the
PRC regulatory structure and the government-sponsored private
organizations, the role of the Party and the UFWD in regulating
112. For a graphical representation of the current religious regulatory system in China,
see infra Figure 2.
113. LAWRENCE R. SULLIVAN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTY 266 (2012).
114. Id. at 43–44.
115. Chinese:
人事部 (renshibu). Though renshibu is typically translated as “human
resources department,” the renshibu in the Second Department fills a very different role. The
renshibu does not handle the employee affairs of the Second Department; instead, the renshibu
controls the advancement and selection of religious leaders and personnel. To avoid confusion,
it has been suggested this alternate translation is appropriate.
116. All information is based on personal communications with former cadres of the
UFWD.
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religious affairs ought not to be overlooked. All control and decision
making pertaining to the religious regulatory system is held by the
Party and the UFWD. Thus, the CPC regulatory structure could be
thought of as the “brain” of the Chinese regulatory system. All
actions carried out by the PRC regulatory structure, and ultimately
all actions and doctrine of official Chinese religious organizations,
originate in the policy statements from CPC leadership and the
UFWD. Any organization hoping to affect or influence Chinese
religious policy should focus efforts on this decision-making locus of
the Chinese religious regulatory system.
B. The People’s Republic of China and Religious Regulation
The People’s Republic of China refers to the government
structure of China. It is notable that the constitution of the PRC
stipulates that the PRC is to operate “under the leadership of the
Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism
and Mao Zedong Thought.” 117 Therefore, while the PRC regulatory
structure is the “face” of religious regulation, it might be
appropriately thought of as the body of religious regulation in
China—inseparable from the “mind” (the CPC), but unable to act
absent command from the CPC. The PRC government acts as an
agent of the CPC leadership and the methods of CPC control will be
outlined in this section.
Similar to the structure of the U.S. government, the PRC has
several branches of government. It is notable that the role of the
legislative branch of the PRC, the National People’s Congress, is
“[t]o enact and amend statutes”; 118 however, to date, the National
People’s Congress has failed to pass any legislation protecting
religious freedom. This is significant because it means that all
religious regulation that is done through agency regulation, which is
less authoritative than legislative statutes, cannot be appealed
through the judicial system until after the agency-provided appeals
process has been exhausted, and depends in greater part on agency
discretion for enforcement. The State Department is the executive
branch of the PRC and is the main source of religious regulation in
117. XIANFA Preamble (1982) (China).
118. Id. art. 67, § 2.
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the PRC. Several agencies within the State Department have
influence on religious regulation: SARA, the Ministry of Civil Affairs
(“MCA”), and the Ministry of Public Security (“MPS”).
SARA was organized shortly after the establishment of the PRC
and is accountable to both the State Department and the UFWD. 119
Specifically, the State Department oversees “business matters”—
things like budgets, payroll, etc.—while the UFWD oversees “policy
matters”—things like agency regulations, administrative approvals,
etc. 120 Within SARA there are nine departments. 121 Among the
general bureaucratic offices are the four business departments, with
each business department being responsible for overseeing specific
religious organizations. The first business department oversees
Buddhism and Taoism; 122 the second, Catholicism and
Protestantism; 123 the third, Islam; 124 and the fourth, other
religions. 125 These business departments are responsible for drafting
regulations and overseeing the administrative approvals for religions
within their jurisdiction.
Furthermore, each business department houses a CPC Party
Branch to which all Party members belong. During weekly Party
Branch meetings, the Party Branch Secretary relays policy
information from the UFWD to SARA officers. SARA is the
national-level organization for religious affairs. Below SARA at the
province, county, city, etc., levels are the Religious Affairs Bureaus
(“RABs”). Depending on their location, the amount of funding, and
the religious population, RABs may or may not have separate

119. WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 70–71.
120. Information is based on personal communications with former cadres of the UFWD.
121. GENERAL AFFAIRS OFFICE OF SARA, http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 30, 2012).
122. GENERAL
AFFAIRS
OFFICE
OF
SARA,
http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/
ywys/index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
123. GENERAL
AFFAIRS
OFFICE
OF
SARA,
http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/
ywes/index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
124. GENERAL
AFFAIRS
OFFICE
OF
SARA,
http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/
ywss/index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
125. GENERAL
AFFAIRS
OFFICE
OF
SARA,
http://www.sara.gov.cn/nsjg/
ywss2/index.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2012).
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business departments to oversee certain religious groups. In other
areas where funds are insufficient to operate these parallel entities,
the RAB does not exist and the UFWD directly fills the role of the
RAB. 126 The MCA also plays a role in regulating religious affairs as it
oversees all social organizations. 127 While the MCA does not issue
religion-specific regulations, all religious organizations are subject to
the same regulations as all other social organizations. Thus, the PRC
maintains a dual oversight over legally organized religious groups.
Some legally organized religious groups are also subject to oversight
by other government agencies where the State Department
determines that the activities of the religious organization fall within
the jurisdiction of the agency. For instance, many Taoist temples
receive oversight from the China National Tourism Administration,
and not by SARA. 128 In August 2014, one Buddhist temple seeking
to avoid an edict by the local government to open its doors to
tourists instead shut down operations. 129
The MPS is a PRC agency tasked with maintaining public order.
The role of the MPS is similar to the role of the FBI in the United
States; accordingly, the MPS should theoretically involve itself in
legally organized religious groups’ affairs only when there has been
criminal conduct. However, the MPS’s involvement in religious
affairs is far more extensive. This is because the PRC government has
been very restrictive in its allowance of religious groups to obtain
legal-entity status. To date, only eight religious associations have
obtained legal-entity status. 130 Thus, every religious group that exists
outside of these eight associations is an “illegal group” that falls
within the jurisdiction of the MPS. Many of the reports of

126. CHAN & CARLSON, supra note 108, at 11–12.
127. See id.
128. Xu Yunpeng, Unregulated Commercialization: How Does this Lead to Nirvana?,
CHINA ECON. NET (Aug. 18, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://views.ce.cn/view/ent/
201408/18/t20140818_3372616.shtml.
129. Lu Chen, Buddhist Temple in China Shuts Doors to Avoid Tourists, EPOCH TIMES
(Aug. 17, 2014, 7:25 PM), http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/886583-buddhist-templein-china-shuts-doors-to-avoid-tourists/.
130. WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 222–23; see also
Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 900.
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infringements on religious rights specify that the persecution was
done by agents of the MPS. 131
Interagency disputes between the MPS, MCA, and SARA have
been reported, resulting in some religious groups receiving different
directives and treatment from different agencies. This is in part due
to the status of SARA as a government administration, rather than a
ministry. Because a ministry holds higher power within the Chinese
bureaucratic system, MPS agents have been reported to ignore SARA
directives in their suppression of groups the MPS deems illegal. 132
This inter-agency conflict is further complicated by what has been
referred to as the “stove-piping effect.” 133 The stove-piping effect is a
bureaucratic phenomenon “in which individual ministries and other
hierarchies share information up and down the chain of command,
but not horizontally with each other.” 134 Thus, local Public Security,
Civil Affairs, and RAB officials are likely not aware of the conflict in
policies for the treatment of certain religious groups.
The CPC maintains control over these several government
agencies through the Party Branches that exist within individual
departments and offices, as well as through the nomenklatura
135
Nomenklatura was derived from the Soviet model of
system.
Communism and describes the practice of the CPC of strategically
appointing important officials to both Party and PRC government
136
posts. As the CPC has exclusive control over the appointment of
certain positions, PRC officials are loyal to the Party, as opposed to
being loyal to the government or the people. Through both the
nomenklatura system and the Party Branches, the CPC maintains
absolute control over the PRC government. Thus, the PRC

131. See CHAN & CARLSON, supra note 108.
132. Id.
133. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 10 (2012).
134. Id.
135. Hon S. Chan, Cadre Personnel Management in China: The Nomenklatura System,
1990–1998, 179 CHINA Q. 703 (2004).
136. Id.
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government is in effect an agent of the CPC, working only to actuate
the policies of the CPC leadership.

Figure 2.1 – A graphical representation of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese
government structures (in Simplified Chinese).
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Figure 2.2 - A graphical representation of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese
government structures (in English).
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C. Official Patriotic Religious Associations and Religious Regulations
The Patriotic Religious Associations that were created in the
1950s and recreated in the 1980s remain the only officially legal
avenue for religious practice. Today, the eight Patriotic Religious
Associations are the only legally recognized religious organizations in
China. 137 There are also only five recognized religions in China:
Buddhism, Taoism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam. These
five recognized religions coincide with the first three of SARA’s
business departments, 138 leaving all other “cults,” “illegal groups,” or
“non-recognized religious groups” to be governed by the remaining
fourth business department.
The Patriotic Religious Associations have a large following,
though generally not as large as the following of their
“underground” counterparts. 139 However, the Patriotic Religious
Associations serve an important role in religious regulation in China.
Similar to the PRC, the Patriotic Religious Associations are subject
to CPC power by nomenklatura. Leaders of the Patriotic Religious
Associations are chosen by the Personnel Office of the Second
Department of the UFWD. Even after leaders have been appointed
by the UFWD, the UFWD disperses policy and doctrinal statements
that leaders are expected to adhere to. Religious leaders have also
been required to attend “training sessions” to learn about the
confluence of their religion and Communist doctrine. After these
training sessions the leaders take a written test, and if they fail they
are removed from their post. 140
Though many Chinese do not attend the official Patriotic
Churches, these Patriotic Religious Associations establish a legal
outlet for religious expression that the CPC and PRC can control.
CPC and PRC officials use the existence of these officially
recognized religions to deflect claims by domestic and international
137. WICKERI, SEEKING THE COMMON GROUND, supra note 16, at 222–23; see also
Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at 900.
138. See supra notes 124–126.
139. See Hongyi, supra note 81, at 48 (stating that in the early 1990s it was estimated
that less than one-fifth of Catholics in China attended the officially recognized Patriotic
Church).
140. ROBERT KUHN, HOW CHINA’S LEADERS THINK: THE INSIDE STORY OF CHINA’S
REFORM AND WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE FUTURE 371–72 (2010).
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human rights critics, by claiming that the Chinese have the freedom
to join any religious organization, so long as it is an organization the
Party approves. Because there is a legal outlet for religious
observance, official CPC and PRC policy has been to suppress any
religious groups that do not belong to these officially recognized
associations. 141 However, it is not practicably possible for the
UFWD, SARA, or MPS to suppress all illegal groups; thus, a large
number of religious groups operate outside the law within a range of
tolerance from enforcing officials. Still, there are many more groups
that are actively denounced in CPC policy and suppressed by PRC
officials.
D. The Three-Market Model and Religious Regulation
In a 2006 article, Yang Fenggang explained the current religious
market in China with his “three-market model.” 142 The Chinese
religious market consists of three markets: the red market, the black
market, and the gray market. The red market is the legal market for
religious worship. This is the legal outlet for religious observance
that the CPC and PRC have created through the establishment of
the Patriotic Religious Associations, which is overseen by the RABs,
SARA, and the UFWD. 143 The black market is the illegal market.
Often referred to as “evil cults” in CPC statements, these are the
groups that are actively denounced by the CPC and actively
suppressed by the PRC through the MPS. 144 Perhaps the most wellknown of these groups is the Falun Gong, discussed below. 145
Yang defines the gray market narrowly as simply those members
of legally recognized religious groups acting outside the law 146—for
example, members of the legally recognized Protestant church who
proselytize off of church premises. 147 However, a much larger
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Leung, Catholic Bridging Efforts, supra note 74, at 187.
See Yang, supra note 70, at 93.
Id. at 97.
Id.
See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 256.
See Yang, supra note 70, at 97.
Id at 109.
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segment of religious observance should be categorized as operating
within the gray market. This segment is comprised of those religious
groups who operate without legal protection, but whose practice is
tolerated by the CPC and PRC. Examples of these groups could
include local Buddhist, Taoist, or Shamanistic temples, Uyghur
Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, certain underground Protestant and
Catholic churches, and religions that have no recognition in the
PRC, such as the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Baha’i. These
groups should be categorized as operating within the gray market
because they operate within a zone of legal uncertainty. So long as
they ruffle no feathers, they are allowed to hold religious services
and, in some cases, even own land. However, they have no legal
rights; they exist by the grace and tolerance of enforcing officials,
making their existence tenuous at best. 148
In his explanation of the Chinese religious market, Yang makes
three propositions. First, “[t]o the extent that religious organizations
are restricted in number and in operation, a black market will emerge
in spite of high costs to individuals.” 149 Second, “[t]o the extent that
a red market is restricted and a black market is suppressed, a gray
market will emerge.” 150 And third, “[t]he more restrictive and
suppressive the regulation, the larger the gray market.” 151 Yang does
well to prove each proposition; however, the remainder of this
Comment will prove an additional proposition: To the extent that
admittance into the red market is restricted, a large gray market will
eventually lead to the emergence of a larger black market. 152
III. CPC AND PRC POLICY AND THE RED, GRAY, AND BLACK
MARKETS: A CASE STUDY
The history of the Falun Gong in the PRC illustrates this final
proposition. The Falun Gong is a quasi-religious qigong group that
has been brutally suppressed by the CPC and PRC authorities for the
past decade. Qigong is a process for meditation, self-cultivation, and

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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paraphysical healing. 153 It is often practiced through meditation,
breathing techniques, and slow-motion martial arts. Qigong has
existed in China long before the post-Cultural Revolution
resurgence of qigong groups. Jiang Weiqiao (1873–1958) was an
influential leader of secularizing the qigong techniques that existed in
Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. 154 In the 1950s the CPC was
very open to the practice of qigong, seeing it as a science and type of
Chinese medicine. 155 In 1950 alone, over seventy qigong groups
were founded and established as legal-entities within the PRC. 156
Beginning in 1979, literally tens of thousands of Chinese
declared themselves qigong masters and began to organize qigong
groups. 157 Some of these groups were rather large, building
“education centers,” “research centers,” and hundreds to thousands
of “cultivation points.” 158 There was perhaps nothing unique about
the Falun Gong when they first organized in 1992. The Falun Gong
registered with the China Qigong Research Society to form a legal
entity. 159 So long as they conformed to the limits against religious
practice, they could operate within the red market of social
organizations. However, as Falun Gong spread across China, their
message adopted increasingly religious overtones. 160 Thus, the Falun
Gong transitioned from the red market to the gray market. For a few
years the Falun Gong retained their status as a legal social
organization, but operated outside the law by practicing religion.
Practically, the Falun Gong had no choice but to operate within the
gray market because China only recognizes five religions and the
Patriotic Religious Associations described above—any other religious
group is considered an “evil cult” and suppressed. 161 By 1996, the
153. See GOOSSAERT & PALMER, supra note 111, at 117.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 120.
156. Id.
157. See Yang, supra note 70, at 111.
158. Id.
159. Beatrice Leung, China and the Falun Gong: Party and Society Relations in the
Modern Era, 33 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 761, 767 (2003) [hereinafter Leung, Falun Gong].
160. See Yang, supra note 70, at 113.
161. See Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 764.
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Falun Gong’s religious message became too overt for the MCA and
the China Qigong Research Society to ignore and the Falun Gong’s
legal-entity status was revoked.
There are two important observations to make about the Falun
Gong between 1996 and 1999. First, the Falun Gong lacked
designation as a legal entity, yet continued to function—largely
without CPC or PRC interference. 162 Second, because of the lack of
legal-entity status, the CPC and PRC were left without many options
for regulating the activities of the Falun Gong. 163 Because the MCA
and China Qigong Research Society had dissolved the Falun Gong’s
status as a legal-entity, they no longer had prerogative to monitor or
limit the actions of the Falun Gong. While the MPS could be
enlisted to disband the group, the Falun Gong were not yet seen as a
threat to CPC and PRC power or social stability, and the negative
international reaction to the forceful suppression of a peaceful group
served as a deterrent for such an extreme measure. Because of these
factors, the Falun Gong fell through the cracks of religious
regulation and were able to operate essentially unregulated. This
existence in legal uncertainty—existing without legal rights, but
within the scope of tolerance of CPC and PRC officials—is the
definition of a group operating within the gray market of religious
regulation, which is why these organizations should also be properly
understood as groups within the gray market defined by Yang.
It was this operation within the gray market, beyond the careful
watch of CPC and PRC structures for controlling social groups, that
allowed the Falun Gong to grow rapidly. 164 By 1999, the Falun
Gong had grown to a membership of over 2.1 million known
members. 165 Of those, approximately one-third, or 700,000, were
also members of the CPC. 166 On April 25, 1999, an estimated
10,000 to 30,000 Falun Gong members encircled the CPC
headquarters in Beijing to protest the refusal of SARA to allow the
Falun Gong to register as a religious group. PRC President and
162.
163.
164.
165.
(2006).
166.
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General Secretary of the CPC, Jiang Zemin, was “shocked by the
affront to Party authority and ordered a crackdown.” 167
The Party response came on July 21, 1999, when Jiang Zemin
issued a directive to dissolve the Falun Gong and arrest the
leadership. 168 Through examining this Party response to an external
threat, the Party’s control over the PRC government apparatus and
“private” entities becomes glaringly apparent. The Renmin Ribao
[People’s Daily] is the Chinese national newspaper, yet reports
directly to the Central Committee of the CPC. The Renmin Ribao
was quick to describe the Falun Gong movement as the most serious
political incident since the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. 169 The
PRC’s legislative body, the National People’s Congress, also
responded by amending an “anti-cult law,” known as Article 300,
that was effective retroactively, labeling the Falun Gong as an “evil
cult,” and giving the MPS authority to suppress the group. 170 Soon
thereafter, several other qigong groups were similarly labeled as “evil
cults” and were similarly suppressed. 171 Within the first two years of
the crackdown, between 150 and 450 group leaders were arrested
and sentenced to prison terms of up to twenty years. 172 Under Party
direction, the MPC also detained between 10,000 and 100,000
practitioners and forced them to serve one to three year terms in
“labor re-education” camps. According to PRC law, “labor reeducation” is not a criminal punishment, but an administrative
punishment, enforced by the State Council or ministries within the
State Council (such as the MPS). Therefore, citizens may be
detained in “labor re-education” camps for up to three years without
being charged with a crime and without trial. 173

167. Id. at 4.
168. Id.
169. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 763.
170. LUM, supra note 165, at 4. See supra Part I.D. for a brief discussion of recent
application of article 300 in the PRC.
171. Yang, supra note 70, at 113.
172. LUM, supra note 165, at 4.
173. Id. at 5.
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Since the CPC’s edict that the Falun Gong is an “evil cult,” there
has been an ongoing struggle between the Falun Gong and the
CPC. The Falun Gong has continued to release reports about
arrests, tortures, and executions done by order of CPC and PRC
officials. 174 Meanwhile, reports are released periodically of Falun
Gong protests in the PRC, including, most notably, the staging of
self-immolations in public places. 175 Despite Party and State efforts
to suppress the movement, the Falun Gong has not been eradicated.
The group continues to operate in China within the religious black
market. 176 Gradually, as more groups have been added to the CPC’s
list of “evil cults” 177 and have been similarly suppressed, these groups
have similarly moved operations underground into the black market.
IV. MEETING PARTY AND STATE INTERESTS THROUGH A MORE
EFFECTIVE REGULATORY STRUCTURE
The difficulties the CPC and PRC have had in dealing with the
Falun Gong and other “evil cults” serves as proof that the current
religious regulatory system has failed to meet CPC and PRC
interests. 178 The main interest of the CPC is maintaining 179 as
evidenced by the increased funding towards maintaining social
stability is strong evidence that the CPC views their ability to
maintain social stability as one of the most important keys to

174. Id.
175. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 779; see also J. David Goodman, A SelfImmolation in Tiananmen Square Is Reported, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011)
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/a-self-immolation-in-tiananmen-square-isreported/ (describing the self-immolation attempt in Tiananmen Square and discussing past
self-immolations done by members of the Falun Gong); Elisabeth Rosenthal, Former Falun
Gong Followers Enlisted in China’s War on Sect, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/05/world/former-falun-gong-followers-enlisted-inchina-s-war-on-sect.html (describing the self-immolation attempts in Tiananmen Square of
people who claimed to be part of the Falun Gong).
176. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 781.
177. For a partial list of groups banned as “evil cults” as of 2006, see Yang, supra note
70, at 107–08.
178. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan supra note 1, at 257.
179. See Russell Leigh Moses, So Much for Stability: Reality Catching Up With the
Communist Party, CHINA REAL TIME REP., WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2012),
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/11/05/so-much-for-stability-reality-catching-upto-the-communist-party/.
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retaining power over the Chinese people. In 2009, funding towards
maintaining social stability nearly matched the funding of the Party
military. 180 Since 2009, funding towards maintaining domestic
stability has increased by 11.5 percent. 181 Traditionally, the CPC has
seen religious organizations, or any social organization other than
the CPC, as a threat to CPC power because these groups have the
ability to indoctrinate organization members and mobilize these
members for their own purposes. 182
In an attempt to prevent religious organizations from serving as
an incubator for anti-Communist ideologists to use in breeding
social unrest, the CPC created the current system of control with the
hope that it would create a highly-regulated legal outlet for religious
observance. 183 By creating CPC-controlled religious associations, the
CPC had hoped to be able to control religious practice from the top
down; by creating the PRC’s SARA and RABs, the CPC hoped to
control religious practice from the bottom up. However, the CPC’s
primary method of maintaining control over religious groups—
strictly limiting the number of religious groups and controlling the
leadership of the groups—is one of the main contributors to the
failure of this system of control. Ultimately, the failure of this
regulatory system is the inability of the CPC and PRC to effectively
regulate groups who do not fit within the narrowly-defined
categories the system is meant to control. 184 Using Yang Fenggang’s
model, the current religious regulatory system is able to regulate
groups within the red market, and has structures in place to suppress
the groups operating in the black market. However, this regulatory
system has no method to regulate groups within the gray market—
both those that exist as “radical branches,” or red-market

180. Cheng Li, The End of the CCP’s Resilient Authoritarianism? A Tripartite Assessment
of Shifting Power in China, 211 CHINA Q. 595, 616–17 (2012).
181. Id. at 617.
182. Thomas David DuBois, Religion and the Chinese State: Three Crises and a Solution,
64 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 344, 347 (2010); Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 257.
183. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 779.
184. Id.
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organizations acting in violation of the law, and those in the gray
market that are tolerated by officials despite having no legal entity. 185
Ironically, while the CPC sought to control religious
organizations to prevent radical groups in fomenting social unrest,
the gray market that has been created by the current regulatory
system has the effect of fomenting this exact type of social unrest.
Under the current regulatory system, groups that exist within the
gray market have three options: first, they can join the legal red
market if they are willing to appoint Party-approved leaders, adopt
Communist-defined doctrine, and become a part of a patriotic
religious association; second, they can continue to operate within the
gray market indefinitely; or third, they can radicalize and join the
black market. Currently, groups who attempt to make the transition
from the gray to red market have only one choice—to submit to the
leadership of a Patriotic Religious Association and, ultimately, to the
Communist Party itself. Needless to say, this option is less than
appealing to the vast majority of religious groups as it would require
the group to accept CPC-initiated changes in its leadership and
doctrine. 186
The majority of religious groups operating within the gray
market naturally opt to attempt to continue operations within the
gray market. However, the CPC and PRC’s attempt to substitute
tolerance of the religious group for legal recognition of the religious
organization is not only theoretically problematic, 187 but also
practically problematic for the CPC and PRC as well. First,
organizations that exist within the gray market have no legal-entity
status. While this does limit the ability of the group to organize and
operate, this also is very problematic for reporting and regulation. As
these organizations are already operating outside of the law, they
rarely, if ever, conform to reporting procedures designed to assist the
RAB in regulation of the religious group. Moreover, even if a group
were to obtain the permission of the local RAB to assemble, there is
no reporting process within the RAB or codified methods of RAB
185. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan supra note 1, at 257–58.
186. See id. at 258.
187. See W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION:
NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 433 (2010) (describing these
theoretical problems in a Moldovan case).
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surveillance or regulation of these groups that exist within the local
RAB’s zone of tolerance. 188
Second, religious organizations that operate within the gray
market cannot operate within the gray market indefinitely. 189 The
Falun Gong is an excellent example of the inability of an unregulated
group to exist within the CPC’s zone of tolerance indefinitely. The
CPC crackdown on the Falun Gong had several motivations, but
among them was the fear of a social organization the size of the
Falun Gong that had the ability to mobilize so many citizens to their
cause. However, at 2.1 million members, the Falun Gong was still
(relative to China) a small group. 190 Moreover, the vast majority of
members participated in Falun Gong out of curiosity, for health
benefits, or for socialization and had no intention to participate in
social disruption. 191 Yet somehow this organization was able to scare
top CPC and PRC officials into a response that would eventually
become every bit as infamous as responses in Tiananmen, Tibet, and
Xinjiang. Furthermore, religious organizations with far fewer
adherents, such as the Shouwang Church in Beijing, have been
blacklisted and persecuted under Article 300’s “anti-cult”
provisions. 192 In the case of both the Shouwang and the Falun Gong,
CPC crackdowns came after CPC leadership became suddenly aware
of a well-organized group that was previously unknown. These
groups had been able to expand and organize without alerting CPC
authorities because of the existence of the gray market. Groups that
seek to continue to operate within the gray market indefinitely will
188. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan supra note 1, at 258.
189. Id. at 258–59.
190. Twelve years after the establishment of the Falun Gong, membership totaled 2.1
million. The Underground Catholic Church boasted approximately 6 million members within
twelve years of its establishment. See Leung, Managing Religious Activity, supra note 12, at
905.
191. Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 765–66.
192. For example, the Shouwang Church is an Underground Protestant Church with
only around 1,000 members, yet this group was blacklisted in 2010 when the CPC discovered
that the Shouwang were preparing to send approximately 200 leaders to an international
evangelical conference. See Ursula Gauthier, Why Do Christian Groups in China Put Authorities
June
2011,
available
at
on
Red
Alert?,
TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2075386,00.html.
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always be at risk that CPC authorities will be suddenly alerted to the
group’s activities and will label the group an “evil cult,” making the
choice to stay within the gray market impossible. 193
Groups operating within the gray market also foment social
unrest when group members become frustrated with their treatment
under the law. As the economy has slowed, many members of the
middle class, who have stopped profiting from the country’s
economic success, have turned to gray market religious organizations
to fulfill their basic needs. 194 However, the CPC’s current system of
regulation suppresses these gray market organizations, and recent
studies in China suggest that when “middle-class Chinese begin to
feel that their voices are being suppressed, that their access to
information is unjustly being blocked or that their space for social
action is being unduly confined, increased political dissent may begin
to take shape.” 195 Studies have also shown that this political dissent
within the middle class has increased in recent years as the economy
has slowed. 196
The gray market directly contributes to the social unrest the
current regulatory system is intended to prevent as groups operating
within the gray market transition into the black market, whether
voluntarily or by edict of CPC officials. By both marginalizing and
actively suppressing these groups, the CPC creates the very type of
opposition groups the religious regulatory system was intended to
obviate. In the case of the Falun Gong, suppression efforts by the
CPC and PRC that marginalized group members had drastic
consequences. Adherents who initially attended Falun Gong
activities for health benefits or socialization 197 became radicals who
believed that “[t]o suffer and even die for the promotion of Falun
Gong is regarded as a golden opportunity for self-fulfillment and
should be embraced with gratitude.” 198 “Like the Holy War in the
Islamic faith, to die for the religious cause is a martyrdom bec[ome]

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

770

See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan supra note 1, at 258–59.
Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 771–72.
Li, supra note 180, at 606.
Id.; Liu, Scharffs & Hollan, supra note 1, at 259.
Leung, Falun Gong, supra note 159, at 766.
Id. at 780.

DO NOT DELETE

733

8/17/2015 8:07 PM

A Broken System

a way to obtain the ultimate fulfillment of life.” 199 And, since the
crackdown on the Falun Gong movement, there have been many
who sacrificed their life fighting against the CPC and PRC
suppression of the Falun Gong. The sad irony of the situation is that
these people and groups became radicalized in response to the
system of regulation the CPC set up to prevent radical groups and
people from disrupting public order. 200
It is also untenable for the PRC to continue to regulate religion
under this paradigm, even if there were radical changes in CPC
policy and groups were no longer actively suppressed under Article
300. Theoretically, Chinese officials could decline to suppress graymarket groups, even when they expand beyond the current zone of
tolerance they operate within. However, the result of this system,
even if it was better than the status quo, would be a patchwork of
decentralized and unequal religious regulation as officials from
different regions would enforce their own laws. Whereas the current
religious regulatory system was created in order to centralize control
over religion, this development would only undermine Chinese
interests.
Therefore, the CPC and PRC would be best served by altering
the current system of religious regulation instead of simply selectively
enforcing it. While ultimately many human rights advocates and
western Christians hope that China will ultimately implement a
wide-sweeping change that would grant all citizens religious
freedom, such a drastic change is very unlikely to occur in the
foreseeable future. However, a less drastic change could be successful
in preventing additional black market groups from undermining
social stability. Thus, the PRC should instead alter current practice
and allow for gray market religious organizations to receive legal
recognition without submitting to the authority of the patriotic
religious associations. If gray market religious organizations were
provided with an opportunity to register as legal organizations, there
would be an incentive for these religious organizations to obey

199. Id.
200. See Liu, Scharffs & Hollan supra note 1, at 259.
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religious regulations. Moreover, after granting legal entity status,
SARA and the PRC would have more tools to regulate the newlylegalized religious organizations—tools that are not as blunt and
heavy-handed as the current practice of prosecuting organizations
and believers under Article 300.
V. CONCLUSION
There has been much criticism of the religious regulatory system
of the CPC and PRC. The CPC has built a framework of controlling
agencies and exercised power over the legal “red market” of religious
activity through the use of these agencies and the nomeklatura
system. The design of the CPC in creating these devices for control
has been to ensure Communist control over religious organizations
to prevent these groups from incubating anti-Communist groups
and subverting Communist control over the Chinese people.
This system of regulation and control has had success in bringing
a certain segment of religious organizations under CPC control.
However, a large “gray market” of religious organizations also exists
within China. These organizations exist outside of the boundaries of
the religious regulatory system of the PRC. Because officials are
unwilling or unable to enforce the harsh regulations the PRC has
established for dealing with all groups that operate outside the
religious regulatory system, this religious gray market has grown to
become extremely large. While official policy has been to suppress
these groups absolutely, many groups operate within a range of
tolerance established ad hoc by local enforcing officials. These
groups that operate outside of the religious regulatory system often
operate under limited or no supervision by PRC officials.
This status quo of allowances, tolerances, and crackdowns cannot
continue. The current religious regulatory system has no methods
for groups operating within the gray market to legalize their
activities. Furthermore, as can be shown by the transition of religious
groups such as the Falun Gong and Shouwang Church, which were
previously tolerated by officials and operated within the gray market,
organizations that operate within the gray market cannot hope to
continue within the gray market indefinitely. As gray market
organizations expand, CPC officials eventually forfeit tolerance and
772
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criminalize these groups’ activities. Groups that are forced into the
black market contribute to social unrest, becoming the types of
groups that the current religious regulatory system was intended to
prevent.
CPC and PRC officials must address these problems, as the gray
market will continue to expand and the potential for future unrest
will increase. The best way for CPC officials to prevent gray-market
religious organizations from joining the black market is to create a
method for gray market religious organizations to legalize their
organizations and join the red market without having to submit to
controls on doctrine and leadership. If CPC officials implement this
change into the current system, legitimate religious organizations
will enter the legal market, allowing for the religious regulatory
system to properly regulate these groups, which will prevent these
groups from being forced into the black market. 201
As CPC officials often cite to historical examples of unrest and
rebellion as reasons that religion must be suppressed and controlled,
they should also hearken back to the failure of policies implemented
by the Qing Emperor in quelling social unrest among the Muslims.
Then, a Manchu official warned the Emperor: “Among the
Moslems, there are certainly evil ones, but doubtless, there are also
numerous peaceful, law-abiding people. If we decide to destroy them
all, we are driving the good ones to join the rebels, and create for
ourselves an awesome, endless job of killing the Moslems.” 202 Today,
CPC officials ought to note that their continued attempts to
suppress religious activities will only drive law-abiding people to join
the law-breakers, creating an “awesome, endless job” of suppressing
dissident groups.
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